黑格尔居然犯这样的逻辑错误！--注解
2015/10/29 哲学园

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     1、关于中国哲学界对形式逻辑的批判情况，可参见葛宇宁：“辩证法和形式逻辑的关系研究述评”，《唐山学报》2014年第9期。pp. 18-20. ……形式逻辑是一种形而上学的思维方式。形式逻辑在认识事物时采用一种片面的、孤立的、静止的视角去认识事物,完全是一种形而上学的思维方式。邱瑞五:“形式逻辑只在事物的静态中、事物的表象中观察事物,把一切事物看作不变的、形而上学隔离着的。”艾思奇:“所谓形而上学,就是从形式论理学产生的,它的特征就是把世界上的一切事物,或者社会的一切现象,或者思想中的一切概念等都看作固定的、各自独立毫不相干的东西。”……辩证法和形式逻辑的关系就像高等数学和初等数学的关系一样,有高低之分。艾思奇就认为辩证法是一种高级的动逻辑,而形式逻辑是一种低级的思想。在许多辩证逻辑的教材中也曾明确宣扬这一点。张世珊《辩证逻辑学》:“形式逻辑是逻辑科学发展的第一阶段,它着重研究抽象思维阶段的科学;辩证逻辑是逻辑科学发展的第二阶段,它着重研究辩证思维阶段的科学。”因此,“辩证逻辑是逻辑科学发展的高级阶段,它突破和克服了形式逻辑狭隘的眼界,解决了形式逻辑自身所无法解决的矛盾。”马佩《逻辑哲学》:“普通逻辑是逻辑科学发展的初级阶段,辩证逻辑是逻辑科学发展的高级阶段。”“普通逻辑和辩证逻辑的关系类似于初等数学和高等数学的关系。”

     2、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations), Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.382. External, sensuous motion is itself contradiction’s immediate existence. Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now, but because in one and the same now it is here and not here; because in this here it is and is not at the same time. One must concede to the dialecticians of old the contradictions which they pointed to in motion; but what follows from them is not that motion is not but that it is rather contradiction as existent.

     3、恩格斯：《反杜林论》，人民出版社1970年版。p. 117.

     4、芝诺将运动理解为位置的变化，这是不错的，但这只适用于衡量某个时间段内物体的运动情况，并不适用于衡量某个时间点上物体的运动情况，因为不论运动与否，物体在某个时间点上并无位置变化。为此，物理学家提出了瞬时速度(瞬时附近时间段的平均速度的极限)的概念；如果在某个时间点上物体的瞬时速度不等于零，即处于运动状态，否则处于静止状态。因此，随着运动概念的深化，飞矢不动这一悖论已经得到了圆满的解决。

     5、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations), Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.382. Internal self-movement, self-movement proper, drive in general (the appetite or nisus of the monad, the entelechy of the absolutely simple essence) is likewise nothing else than that something is, in itself, i

     6、恩格斯：《自然辩证法》，人民出版社1971年版。p. 193.

     7、黑格尔和恩格斯在这里是在用矛盾来描述生命体的运动过程。但这一描述是错误的，生命从出生到走向成熟，再到走向死亡的过程，不管其内在机制如何，都不可能在任何瞬间既是它自身又不是它自身。事实上，生命现象——在经过了彻头彻尾的内部变化后仍可以保持自身的同一性——之所以让人觉得困惑，问题并不出在同一律和不矛盾律，而是出在人们对于具体事物(与抽象事物相对)这一概念的理解上；只要注意到具体事物的历时性特征，那么困惑将烟消云散。事物x的不同时间段xt1、xt2，等等，当然是不同的事物，就像同一个事物的不同空间段xs1、xs2，等等，是不同的事物一样，但这些不同的事物都是同一个事物x的组成部分，因此人们将这些不同的事物归入同一个事物x，并没有任何矛盾之处。(借用赫拉克里特关于河流的比喻：人可以两次踏进同一条河流，虽然人不可能两次踏进同一个河流时间段。)

     8、 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations), Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.383. If to ordinary thought the contradiction which is in motion, in a drive and the like, remains concealed in the simplicity of such determinations, contradiction is, on the other hand, immediately displayed in the determinations of relation. The most trivial of examples – “above and under,” “right and left,” “father and son,” and so on ad infinitum – all contain opposition within one and the same term.

     9、列宁：《列宁全集》第55卷，人民出版社1990年版。p. 118.

     10、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations), Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.358. It is thus an empty identity that they cling, those who take it to be something true, insisting that identity is not difference but that the two are different. They do not see that in saying, “Identity is different from difference,” they have thereby already said that identity is something different.

     11、波普尔：《猜想和反驳》，上海译文出版社1986年版。p. 453.

     12、讽刺的是，关于究竟什么是辩证矛盾，苏联哲学界直到苏联解体也没有达成共识；中国哲学界的争论则一直没有停息(争论现状可参见张建军“逻辑矛盾与辩证矛盾之辩”一文。张建军、黄展骥：《矛盾与悖论新论》，河北教育出版社1998年版，pp. 21-32)

     13、 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.556. “The subject is the predicate” – this is what the judgment says at first. But since the predicate is not supposed to be what the subject is, a contradiction is at hand.

     14、当然，黑格尔在讨论同一律时，确实举了一些“x=x”的例句，但他未必知道它们同时也是“x=y”或“A是B”的例句，他似乎想当然地认为“A是B”中的“A”和“B”是不同的词。

     15 虽然等同语句模式“x=y”是谓述语句模式“Fx”的子模式，前者是后者中的“F”被“=y”(与“y”是单独词项不同，“=y”是概括词项)所取代的结果，但谓述语句模式“Fx”(以及全称语句模式“F ?G”)却不是等同语句模式“x=y”的子模式。

     16、 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, London and New York: Routledge, 1996. p.48n. Hegel’s argument in this portion of “Logic” depends throughout upon confusing the “is” of predication, as in “Socrates is mortal”, with the “is” of identity, as in “Socrates is the philosopher who drank the hemlock.” Owing to this confusion, he thinks that “Socrates” and “Mortal” must be identical. Seeing that they are different, he does not infer, as others would, that there is a mistake somewhere, but that they exhibit “identity in difference.” Again, Socrates is particular, “mortal” is universal. Therefore, he says, since Socrates is mortal, it follows that the particular is the universal—taking the “is” to be throughout expressive of identity. But to say “the particular is the universal” is self-contradictory. Again Hegel does not suspect a mistake but proceeds to synthesize particular and universal in the individual, or concrete universal. This is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions, which, but for the almost incredible fact that they are unintentional, one would be tempted to characterize as puns.

     17、“‘A’是‘B’”中被使用的语言表达式是“‘A’”和“‘B’”，即“A”和“B”的名称。

     18、 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.18. So much has healthy common sense lost respect for the school which still holds on to such laws of truth and still busies itself with them, that it ridicules the school and regards as insufferable anyone who believes that in following such laws one actually says anything at all: the plant is a – plant; science is – science; and so on in infinitum.

     19、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.358. In its positive formulation, A = A, this proposition is at first no more than the expression of empty tautology.

     20、 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. pp.358-359. As to the other confirmation of the absolute truth of the principle of identity, this is made to rest on experience in so far as appeal is made to the experience of every consciousness; for anyone presented with this proposition, “A is A,” “a tree is a tree,” immediately grants it and is satisfied that the proposition is self-evident and in need of no further justification or demonstration.

     21、 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Logic of Hegel. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1965. p.214 (§115). No mind thinks or forms conceptions or speaks in accordance with this law, and that no existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. Utterances after that fashion of this pretended law (‘A planet is—a planet’, ‘Magnetism is—magnetism’, ‘Mind is —mind’) are, as they deserve to be, reputed silly. That is certainly a matter of general experience. The logic which seriously propounds such laws and the scholastic world in which alone they are valid have long been discredited with practical common sense as well as with the philosophy of reason.

     22、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.577. The principle of identity asserts that A is only A, not B; and B is only B, not A.

     23、这显然是与他前面关于同一律具有自明性的观点相矛盾的。

     24、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Logic of Hegel. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1965. pp.213-214 (§115). The propositional form itself contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate, while the present one does not fulfil what its form requires.

     25、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. pp.360. The propositional form can be regarded as the hidden necessity of adding to abstract identity the extra factor of that movement.

     26、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics, trans. J. W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986. pp.136-137. A=A expresses a diversity (that is, two A’s), and this diversity, this other[ness], immediately is not. The two A’s ought not to be equivalent; it is not a case of A=B: B ought also to be an A. But A=A; that is, it is the same A that is on both sides. They do not have an inequality in virtue of their place, as in judgment, merely through being left or right when written, or earlier or later when spoken. These are distinctions that fall away immediately in that one [can]not say which is right or left, etc.; it is not as [if] one were on the right and another on the left; each is the one and the other.

     27、附带说一下，黑格尔在此处将“A是A”写成“A=A”；显然，他认为这两者是一回事，这可以看成他将“是”一律解读成等同关系的又一例证。

     28、Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity, Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press, 1933. p.194.

     29、W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 4rd ed. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1982. p.268. For truth of a statement of identity it is necessary only that ‘=’ [or ‘is’] appear between names of the same object; the names may, and in useful cases will, themselves be different. For it is not the names that are affirmed to be identical, it is the things named. Cicero is identical with Tully (same man), even though the name ‘Cicero’ is different from the name ‘Tully’. To say anything about given objects we apply the appropriate verb or predicate to names of the objects; but there is no reason to expect that what is thereby said of the objects will be true also of the names themselves. The Nile, e.g., is longer than Tuscaloosahatchie, but the names are oppositely related.

     30、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p. 360. The other expression of the principle of identity, “A cannot be A and not-A at the same time,” is in a negative form; it is called the “principle of contradiction.”

     31、Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge Hegel Translations). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p.381. The principle of the excluded middle is further distinguished from the previously examined principles of identity or contradiction that said, “Nothing is A and not-A at the same time.” What this implies is that there is nothing which is not either A or not-A; that there is no third that would be indifferent to that opposition. But in fact a third indifferent to it is given in the principle itself, for the A itself is there. This A is neither +A nor –A and just as much also +A and –A. – The something which ought to have been either +A or –A is here attached to the +A as well as the –A; and again, inasmuch as it is attached to the A, it ought not to be attached to the –A, just as it ought not to be attached to the A inasmuch as it is to the not-A. The something itself is therefore the third which ought to have been excluded. Since in this something the opposite determinations are equally posited and sublated, that third which is here in the shape of an inert something, when taken more profoundly, is the unity of the reflection into which the opposition returns as into ground.

     参考文献

     Hegel, 1965, The Logic of Hegel. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

     Hegel, 1986, The Jena System, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

     Hegel, 2010, The Science of Logic, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

     Korzybski, 1933, Science and Sanity, Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press.

     Quine, 1982, Methods of Logic, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

     Russell, 1996, Our Knowledge of the External World, London and New York: Routledge.

     波普尔，1986年：《猜想和反驳》，上海译文出版社。

     恩格斯，1970年：《反杜林论》，人民出版社。

     恩格斯，1971年：《自然辩证法》，人民出版社。

     葛宇宁，2014年：“辩证法和形式逻辑的关系研究述评”，《唐山学报》2014年第9期。

     列宁，1990年：《列宁全集》第55卷，人民出版社。

     张建军、黄展骥，1998年：《矛盾与悖论新论》，河北教育出版社。

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